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I.  Introduction 
In the Doha Declaration taking full account of the special needs and interests of 
developing and least developed countries was a stated objective of the Doha Development Round 
of trade negotiation on NAMA. In particular, developing countries were supposed to receive 
special and differential treatments which according to Article XXVIIIbis (para 3.b) of 
GATT/WTO included their need for “more flexible use of tariffs protection” (Shafaeddin, 2009). 
 The flexible use of tariffs would imply that the tariff structure of developing countries would be 
such that it would allow discriminatory and dynamic trade policy. Discriminatory use of tariffs 
means that different tariff rates could be applied to different industries in each point time; 
dynamic trade policy would imply that the tariff rates and structure could change over time. 
In practice during the negotiation on NAMA developed countries have been trying to 
impose on developing countries changes in the tariffs contrary to the stated objectives and spirit 
of the Round. Their proposals for tariff rates of developing countries for negotiation has four 
main elements: drastic reduction in the level and dispersion of tariffs rates; binding of individual 
tariffs lines at reduced (low) levels; zero tariffs for some products; applying the same principles 
to all developing countries with a few temporary exceptions for least developed  and “vulnerable” 
countries. Therefore if agreed the tariff structure of developing countries would suffer not only 
from low tariff rates, but more importantly from a tendency towards “uniformity”, “rigidity” and 
“universality”. Uniformity would imply the tendency towards application of the same tariff rates 
to all industries i.e. neutrality of tariff structure rather than selectivity. Rigidity means the lack of 
flexibility in changing tariff rates over time for pursuing a dynamic trade policy. Universality 
implies applying the same rules to various developing counties irrespective of their level of 
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development and industrial capacity-although a few exceptions are envisaged on temporary basis.  
I have explained the need for industrial policy and outline elsewhere the elements of a 
dynamic and flexible trade and industrial policies (Shafaeddin, 2005.b and 2006.b). The purpose 
of this study is two fold. The first is to argue for the need for selectivity of the tariff structure for 
industrialization of developing countries. The second objective is to explain that the need for 
selective incentive structure has increased during the last couple of decades due to changes in the 
market structure and international context of industrialization and competition. Yet the means for 
implementing such a strategy have been constrained by the conditionalities imposed on the 
developing countries through international financial institutions, changes in international trade 
rules through GATT/WTO and bilateral trade agreements between developing and developed 
countries. Hence if the proposals of developed countries on NAMA are also agreed upon they 
would lock production and trade structure of developing countries which are at early stages of 
industrialization in primary products and resource-based products and at best in assembly 
operation and labour intensive items. It also will create constrains for upgrading of the industrial 
structure of those of them which have some industrial base and export capacity in manufactured 
goods.  
To precede, in the following section, we will shed some light on the theoretical 
controversy on the implications of neutrality and non-neutrality of incentive structure for 
industrialization. In sections III the historical evidence for the use of selectivity will be briefly 
reviewed before providing some empirical evidence for more recent years in section IV. 
Subsequently, in section V we will refer to changes in the methods of production and forms of 
international competition and the increasing need for nurturing of domestic firms. The final 
section will conclude the study.  
Let us first clarify the concept of neutral trade policy as there is some confusion in the 
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literature in this respect. Trade neutrality is usually defined as a trade regime in which the 
incentives given to the exports and imports as a whole are equal (Balassa, 1989). Neo-liberals 
regard trade neutrality is synonymous with free trade, i.e. a situation where no incentive is 
provided to either exports or imports.  It should be mentioned, however, that the equality of 
trade-based incentives for exports and imports can be reached at zero incentive (tariff) level or at 
positive incentive (tariff) levels. In the first (restrictive) case free trade prevails, whereas in the 
second (general) case export incentives offset import restrictions and other incentives given to 
production for the home market.  Applying the usual (restrictive) definition of trade neutrality 
confuses a trade regime with high government intervention with that of free trade. Such 
confusion has emerged, for example, in the case of studies on East Asian countries (Chen and 
Devereoux, 1997).  Note also that even when exports and imports on average may receive equal 
incentives, each export and import item may receive different levels of incentives.  Our definition 
of neutral trade regime is the general one thus implying that a neutral trade regime may, or may 
not, involve free trade.  
 
II. Theoretical issues 
The theoretical arguments pro and cons of selectivity of the incentive structure is the 
extension of the argument in favour or against infant industry argument and other forms of 
government intervention in trade and industrial development. The proponents of universal free 
trade argue that selectivity contributes to price distortion and inefficiency because of the resultant 
mis-allocation of resources.  When the use of tariffs, or other forms of intervention, is   accepted, 
by some Neo-classical economists, for supporting infant industries, there is a bias in favour of a 
uniform, and low tariff rates for all industries.  For example, Haberler, the pioneer of modern 
international economies argues that: AA uniform import tariff on manufactured goods, or on 
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broad categories of such goods, is probably the best method of infant industry protection@ 
(Haberler, 1959, 36).  Similarly, Balassa (1975) recognizing the learning effects and externalities 
involved in the promotion of new industries in developing countries, accepted temporary 
protection of these industries. Nevertheless, he maintained that the tariff rates should be gradually 
decreased to an across- the- board rate of about 10 per cent.   
According to some economists the infant -industry case should be distinguished from the 
protectionist argument. To handle special problems of infant industries, provision of selective 
policy measures is acceptable.  Nevertheless, these measures should address the problems directly 
at their source rather than using import duties (Baldwin, 1969).  
The argument on uniform tariff rates centres mainly on low administrative costs and 
simplicity and easiness: as the government capacity in making and implementing decisions is 
often limited in developing countries, it is easier to manage a simple and uniform incentive 
structure, including tariffs, than a selective one. Moreover, it is also argued that the success of 
East Asian countries is due to the provision of neutral incentives to exports and home markets 
(Balassa, 1982). Even when the existence of selective intervention and incentive in the case of 
East Asian countries is admitted, it is concluded that its application and emulation by other 
countries can not contribute to their industrial development (World Bank, 1993).  Furthermore, as 
far as tariffs are concerned, it is argued that the WTO agreement makes the application of 
discriminatory tariff rates often difficult. 
The lack of capacity in decision making and implementation, however, should not be used 
as an argument against non-neutrality of incentives. It is true that there is a positive correlation 
between the decision making capability of the Government and the level of development. The 
lower the level of development, the lower is the capacity of the Government machinery. The 
scarcity of decision making capacity is, in fact, an argument in favour of selectivity rather than 
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against it as explained above. Moreover, the capacity of the government machinery can, and 
should, be improved. In fact, the process of trial and error itself contributes to development of 
such capacity building. It is true that mistakes may be made in the process, but if no decision is 
made, or implemented, the capacity of the bureaucracy would be never enhanced. In other words, 
the lack of government capacity is not an argument for lethargy. Whatever capacity exists should 
be devoted to a limited number of   industries on selective basis.   By being active the 
government may achieve its objective, or it may make mistakes. Both contribute to learning. By 
being passive nothing would be achieved including gaining experience and improving its 
capabilities of the government. In 1950s the Korean Government was regarded incompetent and 
inefficient. Over time the managerial capabilities of the Government in all aspects of the 
Governance has improved tremendously (Madsen, 1989).  
The opponents of neo-liberal economists provide four main arguments in favour of 
selectivity: supply response to relative prices, scarcity, externality and strategic trading.   
1. Supply response to relative prices 
Supply response to prices is much lower, particularly in developing countries, when all the 
outputs of a sector are equally affected and stronger when relative prices increase only for one 
good, or for a few goods (Streeten, 1987). Even in industrialized countries there is some evidence 
that reallocation of resources from non-tradable to tradable sectors, and within tradables from 
importables to exportables (and in the latter from traditional to new products), are more 
responsive to targeted incentives than uniform price structure (Schydlowsky, 1982). These 
general characteristics of the pricing system can be applied to relative prices of various goods 
affected by tariff and non-tariff measures. As a result, if the differential prices of good A and 
good B are affected by tariffs or subsidies in favour of good A, its supply will, cet. par, respond 
better than the supply of good B.  
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2.  The scarcity argument 
The scarcity argument is complementary to the infant industry argument. Real and 
financial resources, particularly foreign exchange and skilled labour are scarce in developing 
countries. So is the decision making capabilities and the management capacity of the government 
in developing countries at earl stages of their development. Hence, to spread resources in an 
excessively diversified manner, without being able to accumulate in any sector the level 
necessary to start a process of cumulative causation, is sub-optimal (Ocampo, 1986, 158).  
The scarcity argument is linked with the dynamic comparative advantage theory. A 
country can not by definition develop dynamic comparative advantage in all production lines. 
Hence, it should concentrate on development of industries on selective basis.  Specific industries, 
however, require specific and specialized factors for attaining and upgrading competitive 
advantage as generalized factors do not themselves provide an advantage in modern international 
competitiveness. Development and upgrading of specialized and high skilled labour requires 
government intervention for training in specific fields (Porter, 1990, 79) since knowledge and 
skills are to a large extent industry-specific and firm specific and “occupation specific”(Lall, 
2005, and Kambaourove and Manovsky,2007).  
Hirschman (1958) argues that Ait is impossible for a truly LDC to leap forward on all 
fronts simultaneously@. The debate he started on the theory of unbalanced growth, vis-à-vis, the 
theory of balanced growth was in fact a debate on selectivity verses uniformity in the general 
context of development rather than trade and industrialization per se. The theories of balanced 
and unbalanced growth have three main features in common. One is the belief in the market 
failure and the need for government intervention. Another is the important role played by capital 
accumulation in the process of development. The third feature is the importance given to 
linkages, complementarity effects and externalities. Nevertheless, the two theses were different in 
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one important respect. According to the theory of balance growth, industrialization should start 
on all front in a balance manner (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943, Fleming, 1955 and Murphy, et. al, 
1989).  By contrast Hirschman argued that it was impossible to develop on all front 
simultaneously mainly because of the scarcity of resources, particularly the decision making 
ability in combining various factors of production. For this reason, he added: A .. The fundamental 
problem of development consists in generating and energizing human action in a certain 
direction.@(Ibid:25). To him, the scarcity of financial and physical resources and market 
imperfection were not the only obstacles to development; imperfection in making development 
decisions was a more important obstacle: A The taking of development decisions is held back, not 
by physical obstacles and scarcities, but by imperfection in the decision-making process@(Ibid, 
26). In other words, he argues, the ability to take decisions in the right time and in the right 
manner is a scarce resource causing deficiency in the combining process and organization of 
economic activities. Such scarcity exist both at the level of the government and firms.  
To overcome this scarcity, Hirschman argues, the decision making should be induced. 
One mechanism to induce investment decision making is to invest in strategic industries1 with the 
highest forward and backward linkages, as various industries involve different linkages and spill- 
over effects. Such industries are regarded as supply dynamic industries which contribute to 
productivity at the industrial level (UNCTAD,2002)  Industries with high linkages will push 
development of other industries as a result of the unbalance created in the supply and demand 
providing opportunities for further investment. The externalities created by forward and 
backward linkages are an additional argument in investing in A strategic industries@as will be 
explained shortly. Here, the inducement effects of investment decision making is emphasized. He 
                     
     
1
  This is in addition to the need for investment in social overhead.  
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also regards dynamic industries, i.e. industries which enjoy growing demand, a source of 
inducement to investment, particularly if they provide linkages. Industries with dynamic demand 
in international market also have better prospects for exports.  
Inducement of investment decisions is important because investment contributes to the 
expansion of production capacity. Nevertheless, Hirschman also emphasises the need for 
maintenance and efficient management of the established firms.  The expansion of capacity is 
necessary, but not sufficient.  The established capacity should also be utilized efficiently, as most 
developing countries suffer from the lack of the ability to use their existing industrial capacity 
efficiently (see also Steiglitz, 1989 and X-efficeincy below). While there exist scarcity of 
management at all levels , the principal scarcity at the firm level is, according to him, the ability 
to maintain and  run firms efficiently which is  far more important than the ability to establish 
them.  Hence, there is a need for a mechanism to induce efficiency and growth within a new firm 
(Hirschmann, op. cit, Chapter 8). To resolve this problem, it is not enough to invest in dynamic 
industries which enjoy growing demand when running and maintaining firms are a problem. They 
should also invest in a few industries where technology is complicated and must be maintained in 
top working conditions. AIt is in these industries that the maintenance habit can be acquired and 
from there spread to the rest of the economy.@(Ibid, 142). Regarding efficient management of 
established capacity, we will refer to the concept of X-efficiency shortly.  
 
3. Externality argument 
There are two types of externality argument for selective protection/trade liberalization. 
The first is the traditional one which deals with technological and pecuniary externalities created 
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in the production process2. The second is externalities related to the scarcity of resources.  With 
respect to the former, if external economies did not exist, or all industries were subject to similar 
externalities, either there would be no need for government intervention or all industries could be 
provided the same degree of incentives and support. In practice, some industries show more 
dynamic externalities than others.  In other words, the nature and the size of dynamic externalities 
may vary from one sector to another and from one industry to another.  
Technological change and learning effects are regarded an important source of dynamic 
externalities (Stewart and Ghani, 1991). Some industries are subject to more and more rapid 
technological change and learning effects than others thus involving more dynamic externalities. 
There is usually an inverse relationship between the level of industrialization and the potential 
technological change. In developing countries transfer and imitation of existing technology 
provides opportunities for faster technological change as compared with industrialized countries. 
In these countries technological change require changes in frontier technology. In developing 
countries support for industries which involve high degree of technological change during the 
phase of infancy is justified. It should be added that if externalities are international (Etier,1982) 
i.e. and were transmitted from one country, or region, easily  to another there would not be any 
need for supporting specific industries even if they involved more externalities than others. This 
would be case because the fruit of externalities created in other countries, would be also reaped 
by an industry located in a specific country.  In practice, however, most externalities are nation-
specific. They may even be mostly region- specific-benefiting from “collective efficiency” 
(Smith, 1995) as is the case in the cluster of semiconductor industries in Silicon Valley in 
                     
     2  Pecuniary external economies are the result of influences of activities of an economic 
agent on another (other) agent(s) through prices.  Technological externalities influence other 
agents directly. 
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California. 
Whether or not a specific industry or activity, or a range of activities, should be supported 
depends on the spill-over effect of externalities. If externalities are external to firms, but internal 
to a specific industry, or country, (externality is nation-specific), that industry should be given 
special support. But if all industries are subject to externalities of the same degree, non-
discriminatory industrial support is required. An example of the later type is learning 
management techniques which could spill-over from any industry to all other industries. By 
contrast, the technological change in the semiconductor industry is specific to this industry even 
if its benefits spill over to all other industries. Hence, the nature of industry and externalises 
involved is important (Steward and Ghani, 1991).  
A somewhat similar approach is taken by the proponents of the technological capability 
building theory (CBT).  Accordingly, competitiveness is achieved at the firm level. To achieve 
competitiveness,   firms should develop their technological, production, investment and linkages 
(production and technological links with other firms) capabilities. Development of such 
capabilities do not takes place necessarily automatically. It requires two elements: A an 
environment that allows market forces to operate for most economic decision- making@ and 
Agovernment intervention mainly where the market fails or where the motives are more social and 
political than economic @(Dahlman, et. al. 1987).  
According to CBT not all market failures are generic calling for functional intervention 
i.e. market friendly policies. Certain market failures are specific to an industry, or market thus 
requiring specific interventions. Skills and technologies needed for industrial development 
require Aactivity- specific capabilities that have to be acquired@ (Lall and Latsch, 1996, 23). In 
other words, Adevelopment of technological capabilities by firms is costly and risky and is faced 
with market failure specific to an industry, or group of industries, since technologies differ in 
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their learning needs and externalities".  Hence, to develop them requires selective intervention. 
(Ibid, 24).  Moreover: 
 ... since all capabilities cannot be developed simultaneously, and since the accumulation 
 of any one capabilities takes time and experience, the sequence in which various  
 capabilities are developed is crucial. And the required capabilities change as a firm or 
 country matures, because of changes in existing capabilities and because of changes in 
 market conditions. Since everything cannot be done at once, selectivity is at the heart of 
 national policy for technological development (Dahlman, et.al., 1987).  
Technological change is not the only a source of external economies requiring selective 
intervention.  Economies of scale and time are two other justifications for selective intervention. 
Economies of scale are not present in all industries/firms or plants, or different industries may 
involve different scale of production. When scale economies are a source of dynamic 
comparative advantage in a specific industry, that industry may require assistant by the 
government, at least temporarily, until it reaches a scale which it becomes cost competitive.  One 
condition for such support is that scale economies be external to the firm, or industry.  
The opponents of selective intervention argue that the size of the domestic markets in 
many developing countries is a hindrance to the exploitation of scale economies.  Hence, outward 
orientation policies should be pursued in order to break this bottleneck (Balassa, 1971). In this 
respect, two points worth mentioning. First, outward orientation is regarded, by Balassa, and 
most opponents of selectivity as neutrality of incentives for exports and imports through free 
trade i.e. zero tariff rates. However, such neutrality can be attained also with positive tariff rates 
(or other incentive measures) for both exports and imports as mentioned earlier. 
Secondly, since development of export capabilities take time and require experience, to 
benefit from the economies of scale sheltering of the domestic market up to a point is regarded as 
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prerequisite  for penetration into the international markets in industries which  involve economies 
of scale (Krugman, 1984). Entering the international market requires competitiveness; an industry 
subject to economies of scale cannot become competitive in the international market before a 
minimum scale of production is reached.  It should be added that the learning period in some 
industries is in particular long. The engineering industry is, for example, a typical case because of 
the technological complexities involved and its requirements for large scale of production. The 
infancy stage in this industry is quite long reaching at least up to 20 years as is evident for the 
successful case of Korea (Jacobsson, 1993).  He argues that: 
The performance of an infant industry is to be compared with what is necessary to 
compete successfully within a strategic group of the international industry. The point at 
which an infant industry changes into an Aadult@ would be defined by it fulfilling all the 
demand in terms of resources and performance that are required for successful 
competition within a particular strategic group (Ibid, 410). 
In this sense there exist more than one type of infancy to acquire production and managerial 
capabilities to compete in internal and international markets.  There exists infancy periods in 
production, technological learning, exportation, marketing in international markets, and 
management in developing strategic advantages.  In other words, the infant industry argument is 
applicable not only to production for domestic market, but more importantly to production for 
exportation. 
Moreover, the faster is the technological change, the longer will be the learning period, 
thus the higher will be and the higher will be the costs related to the learning process and the risk 
involved in achieving dynamic competitiveness. Such risks have increased in recent years due to 
the changes in the organization of firms and the nature of competition in the international market 
as will be explained in section IV.  
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Various industries may not be subject to similar external economies including economies 
of time. Economies of time are defined as the positive impact of present production on the cost of 
production in the future because of the experience gained through the production process. 
Experience gained in various industries during the current period may have different impact on 
current and future cost of production in other industries both at present and in the future. In such 
cases support for specific industries, rather than all industries, is justified. Inter-sectoral 
differences in learning are significant and Athey go beyond the obvious differences due to product 
cycle considerations@ (Teubal, 1986, chap. 7). In other words, differences in the degree of 
knowledge accumulated in different industries would imply that productivity do not increase 
uniformly in all industries.  
Finally, there is yet another type of externality argument which has implication for 
selectivity.  This is related to the diseconomies created for infant and other industries as a result 
of consumption of imported luxury goods.  In developing countries where there is a shortage of 
foreign exchange, Aeach dollar spent on these goods denies availability of that amount of scarce 
foreign exchange to industries where the need for it may be great.@ (Shafaeddin, 1991, b: 94).  
Hence, high tariffs on these products are justified in order to facilitate development of "selected" 
industries by facilitating availability of supply of their imported inputs.  Nevertheless, ways 
should be found, e.g. through denying licenses that production of luxury items is not encouraged 
behind high tariff walls.  
4. Strategic trading theory 
Another argument put forward in favour of selective intervention, targeting, is Astrategic 
trading@. The strategic trade theory is related to the existence of increasing return, imperfect 
competition, dynamic learning economies and the power of governments. Some sectors may 
directly yield higher value per unit of input or high returns per unit of inputs because they 
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generate external economies such as high-technology industry. Trade takes place in a Astrategic 
environment@ where a small number of large governments and firms are active in international 
trade. In particular firms make strategic moves to affect their rivals' actions. Accordingly, it is 
advocated that the government should intervene in the industries which involve rent and/or 
external economies (e.g. Spencer, 1986). According to him advantages from targeting depend on 
“…the right choice of industry to target but…the nature of the targeting instruments…” (Ibid: 
86). Another important issue is whether to “focus towards a single firm or product, or broadly 
focussed towards an industry as a whole...”(Loc.cit).   
In particular, when trade in a product is Amanipulated@, managed, or targeted for support 
by foreign competitors, the Government may intervene in the related industry. The aim is to 
defend the domestic producers through eliminating, deterring or compensating for practices 
which are not adequately regulated by multilateral trade rules (Tyson, 1992).  Such argument is 
even made in the case of developed countries. For example, Tyson argues in favour of such 
intervention in the case of hi-tech products of the USA, particularly those which are widely used 
as industrial inputs or face excessive market power by foreign suppliers, or are critical for 
national security. There is, however, some controversy in the use of strategic trading. For 
example Krugman (1987) argues that even though some industry may yield high return, either 
directly, or through creating externalities, the theoretical support for strategic trade is weak about 
designation of any sector as strategic. Krugman is concerned with developed countries, but 
elsewhere (Krugman, 1987), clearly defends protection of industries subject of increasing return 
in developing countries. No doubt industries subject to increasing return are among “strategic” 
sector. 
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X-efficiency and external economies 
The expansion of the supply capacity alone is not sufficient. As mentioned earlier the 
maintenance of the existing capacity and its efficient operation is also important. To discuss the 
importance of the efficient operation of the installed capacity, we need to explain the concept of 
X-efficiency which is also related to external economies.  
 In technical terms a firm/economy is X-efficient if it produces on a production possibility 
curve (B in Figure 1) rather than inside it (e.g. point A). Efficient allocation of resources 
(allocative efficiency) is accompanied by a move on the production possibility curve. By contrast, 
an improvement in X-efficiency leads to growth through movement from point A towards point 
on curve B. Technical progress or expansion of resources (creative efficiency) will lead to growth 
through movement from curve B to curve C. Allocative efficiency is concern of the theory of 
static comparative advantage. Creative efficiency is in the realm of dynamic comparative 
advantage.  
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Figure 1 production possibility curve    
 
Attention: pleas remove the heading above (figure 4.1…..)  which is in picture and I could not 
do it 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B/
Good A
Good B
A
B
C
Figure 4.1: Production possibility curves
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The utilization of existing inputs by a firm takes place outside market mechanism, i.e. within 
firms, and is affected, inter alia by both organizational factors within the firm and institutional 
factors outside the firm (Leibenstein 1980 and 1989). Moreover, an improvement in X-efficiency 
may involve dynamic externalities. According to Arndt (1955), dynamic externalities related to 
increasing return and complementarity of various lumpy activities may be due to the construction 
of new equipment (investment), or due to the fuller utilization of existing equipment (which is a 
type of X-efficiency). X-efficiency may not only spill over to other firms (through the learning 
effect), but if it takes place in a number of firms/industries, it would involve dynamic pecuniary 
externalities (see footnote 4); if the product produced is used as an input to other industries, the 
reduction in its cost of production will benefit other industries. 
 Institutional factors also contribute to ex-efficiency. The organizational and institutional 
factors also act similarly to infrastructure; in a sense one may refer to them as socio-economic 
infrastructure. Both economic growth at the macro-level and profit of a firm at micro-level 
depend on the availability and efficient use of resources once allocated, i.e., X-efficiency. Hence, 
institutional and organizational deficiencies result in X-inefficiency.  
 In Figure 1, in order to move rapidly from point A to curve B in order to improve 
competitiveness, or from curve B to curve C to expand production capacity, or to upgrade the 
production structure, the development of capacity in organizational, institutional and 
infrastructural factors as well as back-up services are required. In practice, developing countries 
are characterized by underdeveloped organizational and institutional framework, particularly for 
production and exports of manufactured goods. The market mechanism would not function well 
if these factors act as constrains. And they will not be developed on their own. If their 
development is left to the market and the private sector, it would take a long time. Moreover, 
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since their development involves externalities, and is often lumpy, underinvestment would 
prevail. Hence, the government ought to intervene in institutional build up, organizational 
development and provision of other factors necessary for the operation of market forces and 
enterprises3. 
Incidentally, as far as the role of import is concerned Hirshman (1958), like F.List (1856) 
considers the role of import differently at different stages of development. Before, an infant A 
strategic@ industry is established Aimports fulfil the very important function of demand formation 
and demand reconnaissance for the country=s entrepreneurs@ (Hirchman, Ibd.:123). He 
recommends selective import restriction both before and after the establishment of an infant 
industry. A During this prenatal stage of an industry it is desired to prepare the ground for the 
creation of a particular industry by allowing the inflow of import of the related product freely. In 
the meantime, it might be advisable to restrict other imports so as to channel import demand 
artificially toward the product whose eventual domestic production is to be fostered.@ (Ibid: 
124).4  
Trade liberalization should also be, like protection, selective and targeted. The impact of 
trade liberalization on an industry and firm would depend on the level of development of 
technological capabilities of the industry and the speed and degree of liberalization. A rapid and 
neutral liberalization would for example, be detrimental to immature industries. By contrast, a 
slow, gradual and targeted liberalization, which differentiates among activities according to their 
technological capabilities and degree of their maturity, could not only benefit the industrial 
                     
 3 While government might be able to improve some of the institutional and organization deficiencies, it will 
not be able to improve all market deficiencies, since some of the problems facing the government are similar to those 
facing the market. Such are imperfect knowledge, information, and insight (Stiglitz 1989). 
     4 List (1856) has made a similar argument with respect to the role of imports (see Shafaeddin, 2005.c).   
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development of the country, but is also essential.5 Otherwise, the industry in question becomes 
inefficient behind prolonged protective walls.  Before, subjecting an industry to foreign 
competition, it should become subject of domestic competitive pressure (Shafaeddin, 2005.b).  
Before ending this section, two points are worth mentioning. The first point is that there 
are also some practical problems in implementing neutral trade policy. Unless there are zero tariff 
rates on all imports, the introduction of a uniform tariff rate structure to various industries would 
not provide a uniform effective rate of protection to those industries. A uniform effective rate of 
protection requires non-uniform nominal tariff rates because various industries do not use the 
same inputs which could be produced domestically, or imported.  Even if they did, the input -
output coefficients as well as the import coefficients are different for various industries. 
The import coefficient for specific industries is not readily available. Nevertheless, there 
are some data available at the sectoral level. For example, the related data available for a few 
Latin American countries for 1994 before the conclusion of the Uruguay round are shown in table 
1. The table indicates that in each country there is a wide range import coefficients in different 
industries. Accordingly, the ratio of maximum import coefficient to minimum coefficient for 
various industrial groups range from 31 in the case of Peru to 4.3 in the case of Brazil.  
Insert table 1 here 
The second point is that an argument against selective incentive structure is that it creates 
distortions in the price structure.  Two points worth mentioning in this respect. First, the 
international price structure even if it were not distorted, would not represent the domestic 
production capacities and factor endowments of developing countries. It is further influenced by 
monopolistic power of large TNCs and by government’s interferences in international trade. 
Hence, it is already distorted. In the presence of such distortion in the international market, a 
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  For more details see Lall and Latsch (1996) and other contributions to the same volume.  
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distorted domestic price structure is a second best policy. Second, when the objective is to attain 
dynamic comparative advantage in certain industries, investment decisions can not be governed 
by the current price structure. The current price structure is a more useful tool for current 
production than for investment decisions (Scitovsky, 1954). Accordingly, there is a need for 
distorting the current price structure in favour of selected industries to attain the objective of 
attaining dynamic comparative advantage (see also Amsden, 1989). 
 
III. Historical Evidence 
I have shown elsewhere that all early industrializing countries, including UK, USA, 
Germany; and Japan have pursued selective trade policy (Shafaeddin, 2005.c and change, 2002). 
In the following pages I will concentrate on the case of East Asian countries as they have been 
often used by both proponents of neutrality of trade incentive (free trade) and selective 
Government intervention to prove their point of view. For example, the proponents of free trade 
attribute success of Republic of Korea (RK) and other East Asian countries in rapid 
industrialization and export expansion to the operation of market forces (Krueger, 1981).  
Moreover, even when the existence of selective intervention in the market of these countries is 
admitted, it is concluded that selective intervention did not contribute to their success ( Benson 
and Weinstein, 1994).Similarly, it is argued that selectivity in trade policy would be an 
inappropriate tool to be employed in the case of other developing countries (e.g. World Bank, 
1993).  By contrast, the proponents of selective intervention attribute the success of East Asian 
countries, inter alia, to selective intervention (Westphal, 1985, Amsden, 1989 and Wade 1990).  
Two important points are worth emphasising in this section.   First, selective intervention 
contributed to the success of East Asian countries, but selective, and functional, intervention 
alone can not be the source of their success. The combination of market forces and dynamic 
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enterprises together with government functional and selective intervention played a significant 
role in industrialization of East Asian countries. However, the relative importance of the role of 
government in relation to market forces and enterprises has changed over time.  Second, to 
succeed selective intervention requires some preconditions,   and some other factors, than trade 
policy, also play a role.  
1. Selectivity, the role of  Government, market and enterprises; the case of Republic pf 
Korea 
We will use the case of Republic of Korea (RK) as an example, in the following pages and 
make a brief reference to other countries. The Government of RK pursued a dynamic policy 
changing not only its industrial and trade policy, but also the role which it attributed to 
government selective and functional intervention, market and enterprise over time.   
In 1950s, the government intervention continued at three levels. The first was functional 
intervention for development of infrastructure and institutions to strengthen the operation of 
market forces and human resource development. The second was direct intervention in capital 
accumulation through establishment of public enterprises.  The third was intervention for 
development of selected infant industries, basically for satisfying the domestic market. 
A distinctive feature of the Korean industrial policy was, however, to switch rapidly, in 
late 1950s, to promoting exports of products of "selected" industries which had been established 
through infant industry protection. In the meantime, it embarked on development of some other 
"selected" infant industries. In other words, beginning late 1950s, the Government followed a 
policy mix of export promotion and import substitution. Attempts for export promotion was 
initially a reaction to the balance of payments problems in 1958/9, but achievements in export 
expansion led the government to continue its effort for export expansion while consolidating its 
industrial structure.  
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Thus, vigorous export promotion which started in late 1950s-early 1960s became 
dominates government policies in the following decades.  The exchange rate was devalued, the 
tariff structure was changed, some imports were liberalized and export subsidies were introduced 
(Hong, 1977 chap.3). In particular, imports of non-competitive capital goods and inputs were 
liberalized.  The import intensity of exports increased rapidly from 40 per cent in 1966 to 51 per 
cent in 1969.  With the implementation of policies for import substitution of intermediate inputs 
in 1970s, the import intensity of exports started declining reaching 38 per cent in 1976 (Ibid, 
table 3.8). In other words, despite the fact that emphasises was placed on export promotion, RK 
did not abandon its import substitution policies. In 1960s it achieved considerable degree of 
import substitution in cement, fertilizers, refined petroleum, textile yarn and fabrics. Some of 
these products later on became major export items (Hong, 1977).  While in early 1960s labour 
intensive, low technology intensive products, in which the country had static comparative 
advantage, constituted the major items of export, the capital and technology intensity of exports 
gradually increased as the country developed products along its dynamic comparative advantage 
based initially on import substitution (Ibid).  In fact in mid-1980s it pushed rapidly into 
production of capital and technology intensive products6.  For example, the share of electric 
machinery in total MVA which was 2 per cent in 1975 reached 15 per cent in 1985.  Moreover, 
the share of these products in total industrial exports reached over 19 per cent in 1986 
(Lütkenhorst (1989, tables 2 and 5). 
The Government of RK also operated a dual policy structure in its industrial policy in 
another sense:   
AThe duality is between industries in which Korea has a static comparative advantage and 
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   For more details and the evolution of this policy see Lee (1995) and Amsden (1989).
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those in which it does not. In the former sectors, market forces operating in response to 
largely neutral incentives prevail; in the latter sectors, market forces are influenced by 
selective promotional incentive policies and supplemented by instruments of direct 
control and allocation@(Pack and Westphal, 1986, 102). 
As mentioned before, Scitovsky (1954) distinguishes between production decisions and 
investment decisions. He argues that market prices are more useful tools for coordinating current 
production decision. Investments tend to involve more externalities. As externalities create 
divergence between private and social benefits, they require government intervention. Pack and 
Westphal argue that the Government of republic of Korea practiced a different type of duality of 
policies:  
A...the crucial duality is not between production and investment decisions. It is >more 
 nearly= between investment in established industries where there is a static comparative 
 advantage and investment in infant industries where there is the potential for dynamically 
 achieving a comparative advantage@ (Ibid, 125). 
Such a dual policy framework has been applied by RK to attain two main objectives: to promote 
export and to establish infant industries. First, a combination of free trade and provision of 
incentives for exports of well- established industries were applied. The capital and intermediate 
inputs used in export production were exempted from import duties and unitary exchange rate 
was introduced. Further, relatively significant export subsidies were introduced through direct tax 
reduction, preferential interest rates and access to import licences (Westphal, 1990). Note that 
although export incentives were largely applied uniformly to all well-established industries, the 
number of well-established industries- mainly textiles and several other light industries- were 
limited.  In other words, incentives were not provided to all products, but to all selected products. 
 Moreover, the Government applied non-uniform incentives for some industries and changed the 
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level and structure of incentive over time.  Not only the rate of protection varied for different 
industries, but also varied for various products within an industry. For example, in 1982 the 
effective rate of protection for the chemical products varied from 414 to - 6525. (Gunasekera, 
1989, table, 1). 
The second aspect of the dual industrial policy mentioned above was development of 
infant industries, industries in which the country could develop dynamic comparative advantage. 
For this purpose non-neutral policies were applied. Protection was the main incentive in most 
industries, but fiscal and monetary incentive was also used. An important aspect of the industrial 
policy applied to infant industries was that they were right from the beginning encouraged to 
export a part of their production mainly through marginal cost pricing (ibid, 47-49).  
The Government's role was not confined to the provision of incentives alone. It also relied 
on and closely interacted with firms and market.  In particular, it made the companies subject to 
“performance requirements”; the incentive provided to them was in exchange for their 
performance. In other words, it set certain performance standards and targets for production and 
export by firms and envisaged sanctions in the case of non performance. Sanctions could consist 
of withdraw of privileges, including import license, tax holidays, fund allocation, subsidy and 
preferential interest rates, from firms including their closure (Westphal, op. cit, Amsden, op.cit.). 
 There was also a time pressure on industries to become efficient by fast reduction of import 
duties after a certain period of protection.  Thus the response of firms to the incentives would 
take place initially not only through the market forces but also through the reaction to the set 
targets and envisaged sanctions.  
Nevertheless, the government followed a dynamic trade and industrial policies as far as 
the role of government, market and the private sector is concerned. As time passed and 
experience was gained in exportations in certain industries, the role of market forces and 
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competition among enterprises increased and the importance of targeting and sanctions were 
reduced.  Moreover, as international competitiveness improved, the amount of subsidies was 
gradually reduced. For example between 1963 and 1980 the rate of export subsidy was, on 
average, declined from around 40 to 50 per cent, to around 20 per cent (Kim, 1994, 621). In other 
words, over time, private enterprises felt more pressure from competition and market forces than 
from the Government. 
The Government and the private sector closely cooperated in setting and implementing 
the targets, in exchanging information on the market prospects in removing the bottlenecks and in 
finding solutions.  Both the private sector and market played important roles in industrialization 
of RK.  For developing infant industries and promoting exports, the government helped 
development of private enterprises, chaebols. Nevertheless, certain industries, particularly heavy 
industries were initially developed directly through public enterprises.  Public enterprises 
established industries for which large investment was required and/or the private sector was not 
prepared to take the related risks. Shipbuilding, chemicals and steel are examples of these 
industries. Chaebols are large conglomerates which apart from their function as production 
agents initially internalized some functions of the market because of the lack of supporting 
infrastructure and institutions such as credit, trade, marketing, distribution, etc. at early stages of 
development. For example, the private sector, dominated by Chaebols relied on internal sources 
of finance within the firms for about half of their need in 1963-5. As the credit and financial 
institution developed, however, this ratio declined to about 26 per cent in 1987-91 and the 
reliance on these institutions increased to about 74 per cent (Amsden and Euh, 1993, table 1). 
Over time, however, the relative role of large private enterprises, Chaebols, in production 
increased as is shown in table 2. 
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Insert table 2 here 
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2. The role of other factors  
It would be a mistake to attribute Korea=s success in acceleration of industrialization and 
development solely to non-neutrality of the incentive structure alone.  Many other factors such as 
high saving rate, acceleration of investment in human and physical capital etc. were also very 
important in the success of the country in acceleration of development and export expansion of 
the country (Broadford, 1987). So was development of agriculture, human capital, and 
infrastructure and market institutions.  
Development of agriculture facilitates industrialization and competitiveness in two ways. 
First, the traditional view is that increase in agricultural output and productivity improves the 
income level of farmers thus contributing to the increased size of the domestic market. As a result 
demand for industrial goods will increase allowing infant industries to exploit economies of scale 
and eventually make transition to outward-orientation by becoming internationally competitive 
(Grabowsky, 1994a and 1994.b). The existence of the resultant growing domestic market would 
further increase the credibility of government=s attempt to discipline the firms by threatening 
them to withdraw protection and support because the firms see they have more at stake to lose if 
the government withdraw its support (op.cit.). 
The second and more important way in which the growth of agriculture could contribute 
to development and competitiveness of the manufacturing sector is through the expansion of food 
production. Availability of food products as basic (wage) goods contributes to non-inflationary 
growth of a country easing the pressure on the balance of payments and helping to prevent wage 
increases in the urban areas. Agriculture, however, is a Asupply determined A activity the growth 
of which is constrained by various factors such as natural, availability of fertile land and water; 
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institutional, e.g. credit facilities and agricultural support services; and infrastructural factors, 
road and transport facilities. Hence, its development can not be left to the operation of market 
forces alone. Moreover, the fact that international prices of main food items have been distorted 
by agricultural protection and subsidies in developed countries particularly in post-war II period, 
has made competitiveness of domestically produced items difficult.  
One important contributory factor to the acceleration of industrial development, not only 
in RK but also in other East Asian countries, is their special attention to the development of food 
prior and during the period of industrial development. In Republic of Korea the emphasise was 
placed on the development of this sector, particularly food, in the tariff and other incentive 
structure and in general development policy (Kuznets 1997). In Japan important improvement in 
agricultural development took place during Tokugawa period, i.e. before the Meiji revolution. 
These efforts were intensified during the Meiji period and continued over time including the 
post-world war II. Throughout these periods production of rice, as the main staple food, was 
protected and heavily supported by the Government (Hayami and Ruttan, 1985). Similarly, both 
Taiwan and Korea emphasized development of the agricultural sector during their industrial 
development (Grabowski, 1994.a). In a more recent period the success of Indonesia in non-
inflationary development is attributed to a large extent to the channelling of oil revenues to the 
development of rice production (Shafaeddin, 1989). Industrial development of Thailand and 
Malaysia is also indebted to the development of food production.   
As far as human capital, experience and know-how is concerned, it should be mentioned 
that when RK started its industrialization in a vigorous manner i.e. after the Korean war of 1950-
53; its industrial base was small then. The share of Manufacturing sector in GDP was only 6 per 
cent in 1953 (Hong, 1977, table 2.5). Nevertheless, the country had experienced considerable 
industrial activities before the war and inherited a wealth of experience and human capital 
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necessary for industrialization and institutional and infrastructural development.  Even back in 
1940 the share of manufactures in total value added was 15 per cent (Ibid, table 2.1).  The 
industrial base of the country was ruined during the war, but the country had a wealth of 
experience and know- how, inherited from the Japanese colonial era and the Korean War 
(Bruton, 1998). Moreover, both before and after the war the Government placed emphasize on 
education, hence the general level of education of the country was relatively high in 1950s.  The 
percentage of population enrolled in schools in 1954 was 17 as against 7 for India, 9 for Brazil, 
12 for Mexico, 13 for Germany, 15 for England and Wales, 16 for Argentina, 22 for the USA and 
23 for Japan (Amsden, 1989, Table 9.1). In 1946 over half of the work force had primary 
education. Moreover, secondary and college education was expanded rapidly in 1950s and 1960s. 
 For example, in 1946, 7.4 per cent of the workforce had secondary education. This ratio reached 
33.9 in 1963 and the percentage of the workforce with college education increased from nil to 7.6 
over the same period (Ibid, Table 9.3).   
Furthermore, serious effort was made by the Government to develop infrastructure and 
market institutions such as the banking and credit system, stock market, trading companies for 
marketing and collection of information, saving institutions, etc.  Significant attempt was made to 
develop the capacity of bureaucracy to gather and analyse information, review targets, make 
decisions and implement plans.  
Selective intervention in RK was not without costs. These costs included not only the cost 
of protection in general, but also the cost of making mistakes and corruptions (Amsden, 1989, 
146).  For example, it is argued that targeting of the automobile sector in mid 1970s was 
premature because of the small size of the domestic market and underdevelopment of skilled 
labour.  Similarly, cost is believed to have occurred in the case of Taiwan (Auty, 1993). 
Moreover, it was argued, the long-term benefits may be limited because of rapid technological 
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change which limits the scope for exporting on a scale which Japan exported at a similar stage of 
development of its car industry (Ibid). While the argument about premature development of the 
industry may be valid, the argument about the long term-benefits of supporting the automobile 
industry was not necessarily confined to the car industry and could apply to a lot of industries, 
e.g. electronics and other industries where technological development is rapid.  Further, the fact, 
that technological development is rapid in an industry makes make targeting more relevant (see 
below). 
 
3. Other countries 
While the case of RK was used for illustration, it should be mentioned that with the 
exception of Hong Kong almost all early and late industrializes pursued their industrialization 
and manufacture export expansion on selective basis. England started infant industry protection 
with woollen and cotton products and moved later on to some other selected items.  USA, 
Germany and France pursued somewhat similar approaches (Shafaeddin, 1998 and 2005.a). 
Japan started its infant industry development through so-called Awild-geese- flying pattern@ 
(Akamatsu, 1961 and Baba and Tatemato, 1968). In this model a product was chosen for a 
successive pattern of imports, domestic production and experts. In other words, the policy was 
not confined to import substitution, it stressed the Acontinuity of import substitution while 
pushing into and perusing export expansion@ (Yamazawa, 1990, p.xi). At the beginning cotton 
yarns and machinery were imported and domestic production of cotton textiles was protected. 
But exportation of cotton cloth began in early 1890s and import substitution of spinning 
machinery began in late 1890s. Exportation of spinning machinery started in early 1920s and 
Japan was the net exporter of these machinery in 1930s (Baba and Tatemoto, 1968).  Hence, a 
cycle which began in 1878 was completed in about fifty years. While reference was made here to 
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one industry, the Government chose some other industries and followed the same cycle of 
industrial deepening through infant industry development and infant export expansion policy by 
providing necessary incentives for exports through subsidization and other incentives. 
In the case of Japan, there is overwhelming agreement that selective intervention has 
contributed significantly to industrialization of the country. Nevertheless, some have argued that 
the Government has made mistakes in choosing the industries. Some industries chosen during 
1955- 90 for support were among slow-growth industries such as mining and processed food etc. 
(Benson and Weinstein, 1994). In this respect, however, three points worth emphasizing. First, 
the choice of industries and the degree of support has changed over time from one period to 
another. So has the rate of growth of production and export during the course of the life cycle of 
the industry. For example, while textile was a dynamic sector during early stages of 
industrialization, later on its importance in the industrial structure declined in favour of other 
industries. Secondly, dynamic growth was not the only criteria in choosing an industry for 
support. Some industries were supported for their linkages and externalities, other were 
supported because they were strategic (in the sense of the need for possessing some domestic 
production capacity for security reasons). Examples are mining, coal and oil refining and food 
processing. Some other industries were chosen for support because they were technological 
leaders.   Finally, whether or not one has made a mistake becomes clear only ex-post. To make 
decisions is an ex-anti process involving trial and error.  Making mistakes is not an argument for 
the lack of intervention in all circumstances or for providing all industries the same incentives. 
Taking action always involves risks of making some mistakes. The one, who does not act, does 
not make many mistakes. Nonetheless, not to act itself is the worse mistake.  
The experience of other developing countries also shows that non-neutrality of tariff rates 
and non-tariff measures are important for providing incentives to production, particularly for 
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exports. For example, it has been shown that during 1960s till mid-1970s, 90 per cent of clothing 
exports from developing countries originated in the few countries that allowed exporters access 
to inputs at international prices (Chenery and Keesing, 1979). These countries protected their 
domestic market at the time by imposing high rates of tariff on output but left imports of inputs 
free.  In the case of other newly industrialized countries also selective intervention has, inter alia, 
contributed to their success (Dahlman, et. al.).  Generally speaking, the empirical evidence does 
not necessarily disprove the efficacity of selective infant industry protection during 1960s and 
1970s even though it requires certain preconditions (Westphal, 1981).   
 
4. Preconditions for selective intervention 
The experience of East Asian countries indicates that success in selective intervention 
requires a few important preconditions: government will and capacity of the bureaucracy for 
decision making, designing and implementing policies.  Moreover, it requires development of 
human capital, infrastructure and institutions as mentioned earlier. 
Government=s strong determination for rapid industrialization and export expansion, and 
indeed general development, is required to surmount bottlenecks and problems created on the 
way of development of the selected sectors. The capacity of the Government=s machinery is 
important because decisions are to be made in correct manner and in right time and should be 
implemented and reviewed efficiently. As far as Government will is concerned, it is crucial no 
matter if a neutral or non-neutral incentive structure is perused as long as the objective is to 
accelerate the course of development beyond what is feasible by the market forces.  
While the design of policies is important, the policy instruments used in East Asian 
countries have been similar to those applied in some other developing countries. The major 
difference has been in the role of trial and error and  A the manner of implementation [of 
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decisions] and monitoring [of their results]@(Bruton, 1998, 924). Both in Japan and RK there was 
no rigid blueprint for industrial policy. When a policy worked it was pursued, when it did not it 
was changed. In other words,  A Government learning, not government minimizing, is the 
objective.@(Ranis, 1978 cited in ibid, 925). To implement its policies, while providing incentives, 
the Government of RK also managed to enforce the discipline in the private sector in the manner 
explained above. Many other developing countries provided incentives, but either did not require 
performance, or did not discipline the private sector where the targets were not met. 
 
IV.  Some empirical evidence in recent decades 
The historical evidence available on the question of Aselectivity@ is confined mainly to a few 
countries located in East Asia. As the tariff structure of some other developing countries show 
dispersion, even if they did not try purposefully and systematically to apply non- neutrality in 
their trade policies, it would be interesting to examine how it has affected their export and output 
performance.  
1.  Methodology and data 
To do so, we have chosen 1980-87 periods and studied a sample of 32 developing countries. 
There are two main reasons for our choice of the period. The first is availability of data. 
UNCTAD started compiling data on trade control measure, although not on annual basis, for the 
period beginning 1980. The second reason is that developing countries began trade liberalization 
under the pressure from the World Ban and IMF through Structural Adjustment and Stabilization 
Programmes from early 1980s after the emergence of economic downturn in the world economy 
and appearance of balance of payments problems in developing countries. As time passed, their 
average tariff rates declined and their structure of tariffs became more and more non-
discriminatory under the pressure from the International Financial institutions and subsequently 
  
36 
due to the Uruguay Round trade agreement. In other words, there has been a trend toward 
lowering tariffs and uniform tariff rates while non-tariff measures have been reduced to nil or to a 
bear minimum in most cases. Thus, 1980-87 is a reasonable length of period during which still 
some discriminatory tariff structure prevails in the sample countries before further changes. Since 
then more and more countries have not only reduced their tariff and non-tariff measure 
considerably but they also have reduced dispersion in their tariff rates as already mentioned.   
Third, the choice of the sample is also drived, to a large extent, by the stage of 
development of the manufacturing sector of the country.  Two cut-off points were chosen to 
exclude countries which did not have some manufacturing export capacity around mid-1980s.  
The reason was that it was noticed that for a large number of countries data on manufacturing 
exports included re-exportation or shipment of some equipment for repairing abroad.  First, the 
sample includes countries with minimum export of manufactured goods of 75 million dollars in 
1986.  Second, manufactured products should constitute at least 5 per cent of total exports of the 
country in the same year.  However, five countries for which one or both of the above two criteria 
are not met were also included in the sample in order to have some low income countries with 
small industrial base in the sample. These are Ghana, Nigeria, sierra Leon, Ecuador and Bolivia. 
The sample includes countries from different regions, with different levels of development, 
industrial base and also with different initial policy stance and varied attempt at trade 
liberalization and exchange rate adjustments.  
The data on exports and output are from World Bank sources which are, in turn, based on 
the UNIDO=s definition of manufactured goods which include both processed and semi- 
processed products.  Such inclusion may inflate growth of exports in cases value added in 
processing is small and the weight of the processed and semi-processed goods in total exports has 
increased. The growth of exports for certain countries could be inflated also for another reason; 
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that is, the increase in the import intensity of exports partly caused by trade liberalization. This is 
particularly true in the case of countries where exports from export processing zones constitute a 
significant proportion of total exports of manufactured goods, e.g. Mauritius, Malaysia and to 
some extent Mexico. For example, in the case of Mauritius, the import intensity of EPZ=s exports 
rose from 56 per cent in 1982 to 68 per cent in 1986 (Shafaeddin, 1991). 
Data on exports in real terms are used as an indicator of export volume. For calculating 
exports in real terms the World Bank unit value indices for exports of manufactured goods of 
countries concerned, which is the only index readily available for these products, are applied. 
These indices seem to be estimates and hence should be regarded with certain degree of caution.  
The data used for trade control measures are based on UNCTAD Directory of Import 
Regimes, for the period 1984-1987. The use of data for the last 3 years of the period concerned 
underestimates the degree of non-neutrality for the whole period as there has been a tendency 
towards uniformity of tariff rates around mid-1980s. Hence, it will intensify the results as will be 
shown shortly.  The index of neutrality of tariffs (I) is calculated as follows: 
                     R 
    I= ------ 
                     X 
where R is the range and X is the average tariff rate for manufactured goods.  R is the difference 
between the maximum tariff rates and minimum tariff rates for (16) sub-groups of product 
categories used by UNCTAD (see appendix A.1).  The use of range for sub-groups was preferred 
to that for individual products for two reasons.  First, sub-groups represent various industries. As 
one is more concerned with industries than specific products they are more suitable.  Second, the 
range for individual products may be extremely high because of extremely high tariffs on a few 
luxury products or on some other products for revenue reasons.   
 The higher the index (I), the higher the selectivity of tariffs; I=0 indicates absolute 
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neutrality. For each product category the maximum (minimum) tariff rates are the A average of 
the highest (lowest) tariff rate within each CCCN [Customs Cooperation Council Nomenclature] 
heading belonging to the corresponding product category@. Mean tariffs are calculated similarly.  
The averaging of maximum, or, minimum tariffs for various products in each category prevents 
inclusion of extreme values of the range.  The extent of non-tariff measures also varies from one 
product to another.  Nevertheless, such variation is not easily measurable.  Hence, tariff range is 
used as an indication of neutrality/selectivity of tariff rates.  Total charges include tariffs, 
commissions and all other fees and charges imposed on imports at the border.  
The sample countries are grouped into three main categories according to their 
performance in export of manufactured goods, i.e. high export growth, low, or negative,  export 
growth and moderate export growth. As the last group include only three countries, the focus of 
analysis is on the first two groups. Within each group, countries are classified into three sub-
groups according to their rate of growth in MVA7, i.e. slow, moderate and high.  
2. Results 
The data on indicators of trade control measures are shown in tables 3 and A.2.  Table 3 
indicates first of all that on average countries in group A (those with high export growth) 
show lower than the average level of nominal protection for the sample as a whole in terms of 
mean charges. The mean charges for group A is 35.5 as against 41.7 for the sample as a 
whole.  Moreover, 9, out of 11 countries in the group, show significantly lower than average, 
or around average (for Sri Lanka and Thailand), total charges. Only Turkey and particularly 
Pakistan show substantially higher than average charges. Similarly, with the exception of 
Turkey, Indonesia and Pakistan all countries in Group A show significantly lower mean 
                     
     7 For the definition of low, slow, moderate and high export and MVA growth rates  see 
footnote "h" at the bottom of table A.2. 
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NTMs than the sample as a whole. Although the mean non-tariff measures (NTMs) for 
groups B and C are lower than the average value of NTMs for Group A, the average for 
Group A is inflated by three countries: Indonesia, Turkey and Pakistan. When these countries 
are excluded, the average for Group A and Sub-Group Aa@ declines to 21.6 and 19.2, 
respectively.  
Insert table 3 here 
By contrast, countries in group B and C, i.e. those with moderate, low or negative, export 
growth show, on average, higher indicators of protection than the sample as a whole. The mean 
value of total charges for these groups are higher than the average for the sample and around 45 
per cent of countries in these two groups show higher than, or around,  average nominal charges. 
Moreover, around half of these countries show higher, or around, the average indicator of NTMs 
for the sample as a whole.  
Hence, in the first sight one may attribute better export performance of group A to its 
lower level of protection and its trade control measures and its higher growth rates of MVA to 
export growth.  While this statement is to a large extent correct, two points should be 
emphasized. The first is that the countries covered by group A, B and C is not at the same level of 
development and their needs for trade policy are different. Most countries in group A, particularly 
in sub-group a, are those with relatively higher level of development and considerable industrial 
base and export capabilities (table A.3). When countries reach a certain level of development and 
industrialization, they  need to liberalize, on selective basis, in order to provide incentive to and 
pressure on  domestic producers of industries which are near maturity to make them  
internationally competitive and expand exports.  In fact, when this was delayed, for example, in 
the case of Brazil and India in the period concerned, export expansion was slow. By contrast, 
most countries in group B and C are those with small industrial base and little experience in 
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industrialization and exports of manufactured goods (table A.3). For these countries, although 
selective liberalization is needed, uniform liberalization may lead to deindustrialization in terms 
of output losses and the lack of investment in the industrial sector as most of their industries can 
not survive competition from imports.  
The second point is that countries at early stages of development and industrialization 
need to build-up their supply capabilities before entering the international market. In fact, if one 
disregards group C because of its small size in the sample, the sub-groups with higher control 
measures have shown higher rates of growth of MVA. This is not unexpected as protection 
shelters the domestic market. This should not however imply that protection should be prolonged. 
Beyond a limit, even if domestic production increases it will be at the cost of inefficiency and the 
lack of ability to exploit external markets. As the example of Republic of Korea in Group A 
indicates, the country achieved the highest rate of growth of exports and output deposit the fact 
that its mean charges and mean non-tariff measures (NTMs) is lower than the majority of the 
countries in Group A as mentioned earlier.  
Another important finding is that the non-neutrality of tariffs seems to be an important 
factor in export, and particularly, output performance.  According to table 3, the index of 
selectivity of tariffs for group A, countries with high rate of export growth, is much higher 
than the average for the sample and is considerably higher than that of group B, i.e. countries 
with low or negative rate of export growth. The number of countries included in group C is 
small and the average is inflated by the figure for Senegal. Within Groups A and B, with the 
exception of sub-group c-India-higher growth rate of value added is associated with higher 
index of selectivity.  While output growth has been significant for India, its lack of success in 
its exportation until very recently could be attributed to prolonged protection and the lack of 
selectivity in its trade policy until early 1990s.  High rate of tariffs were applied in this 
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country to almost all industries and products, including inputs and intermediate ones. For the 
1984-87 periods, the average tariff rate for primary products and manufactured goods were 
90.8 per cent and 101.9 per cent, respectively, and total charges for the same product group 
were 111 per cent and 119.7, respectively.  Within the manufacturing sector only machinery 
and equipments were subject to slightly lower rates of around 90 per cent (UNCTAD, 1994). 
The importance of selectivity of tariff rates in export and output growth is more evident in 
table 4.  Accordingly, 54 per cent of countries in Group A show greater than the average index of 
selectivity.  By contrast about 60 per cent of countries in group B and 67 per cent of countries in 
group C show lower than average indicator of selectivity. The sharp contrast between sub-group 
Aa@-countries with higher rates of growth of exports and MVA- and sub-group Ae@- countries with 
low, or negative, rates of growth of exports and outputs- indicates the greater influence of 
selectivity in growth of MVA than growth of exports. Therefore, at early stages of 
industrialization, when expansion of production is the main concern, selectivity takes more 
importance.   
Insert table 4 here 
 In short, the empirical evidence indicates that specialization through selective support of 
industries tends to contribute to growth of exports and, particularly MVA. 
These results are reached despite the fact that the selectivity index included only tariffs. In 
practice, non-tariff measures also may contribute to non-neutrality of trade policy regimes. 
Moreover, non-trade measures such as fiscal incentives, taxes, amortization allowance, 
preferential interest rates, subsidies on output or exports and inputs; drawbacks; import license 
and foreign exchange allocation; etc. might have been employed by some countries in their trade 
and industrial policies affecting non-neutrality of incentive structures.  Moreover, theoretically 
speaking, it is possible that after countries undertook trade policy reform and moved toward 
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uniform tariff structure, their performance has improved.  This is not, however, in fact the case as 
I have shown elsewhere (Shafaeddin, 2006.c). 
  
V. New forms of competition and the growing need for selectivity 
In this section we will argue that while the need for nurturing of industrial sector on selective 
basis in developing countries has increase during the recent decades, the means to do it has been 
constrained. The policy space of developing countries has shrunk due to the conditionalities 
imposed on developing countries by international financial institutions, through Structural 
Adjustment and Stabilization Programmes, bilateral trade agreements and WTO rules.  
 
1. New methods of production and competition 
The entry of new firms of developing countries into the world market has become more 
complicated in recent years. On the one hand trade liberalization through Uruguay Round has 
provided new opportunities for exports of developing countries through some improvement in 
market access in developed countries. On the other hand, three main developments have taken 
place making entry of new firms of developing countries into international market more difficult. 
 These are:  rapid technological change, increase in market concentration and dominance of 
TNCs in production and international trade, increase in the scale of production in most industries, 
globalization, production sharing and development of other new methods of production and 
competition.  In other words, the barriers to entry of new firms have been mounting continuously 
(Jacobsson, 1993) thus increasing the risks of their success.  The increase in technology intensity 
of production and distribution and the rapid pace of technological change itself contributes to the 
need for larger scale of production (Arthur, 1996).  Further it increases the knowledge intensity of 
production, thus prolonging the process of learning and experience, and the need for R&D.  
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The increasing return related to the scale of production creates instability and movements 
away from equilibrium (Young, 1928). A if a product or a company or technology -one of many 
competing in a market-gets ahead by chance or clever strategy, increasing returns can magnify 
this advantage, and the product or company or technology can go on to lock in the market.@ 
(Arthur, 1996, 100). As a result, other companies need to adapt to be able to compete. But 
adaptation is not changes in reaction to the past events. It Ameans watching for the next wave that 
is coming, figuring out what shape it will take and positioning the company to take advantage of 
it.@ In this sense Aadaptation is what drives increasing- returns business, not optimization.@ (Ibid, 
105). In the world of increasing return the current behaviour of any firm affects not only the 
current, but also future, situation of other firms in the same industry (Young, 1928).   
In such a Schumpeterian world Acreative destruction@ is a source of competitive process, 
competitive advantage and cumulative change. Competition does not take place on cost of 
production alone and products are not homogeneous. Competitive advantage of firms depends on 
their strategic behaviour in gaining and maintaining, or improving, their strategic position over 
time Porter (1990) and Best, 1990). 
In fact, in recent years to reap economies of scale at the firm level, there has been a 
significant and unprecedented acceleration of mergers and acquisition during recent decades, 
particularly since early this century, as is shown in table 5. Furthermore, TNCs have been more 
and more concentrating on specialization in core products in order to benefit from scale 
economies both at the plant and firm levels. This is in contrast with the past when diversification 
was often emphasized in order to benefit from economies of scope.  To provide some ideas about 
the scale of firms at the global level, in 2006, the total value of assets of the individual 
companies, among the biggest 100 TNCs, ranged from nearly $700 billions to 50 billion as is 
shown in table 6.  The same table indicates that the value of sale of these companies is also 
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significant and foreign affiliates account the bulk of assets and sales of the TNCs.   
Insert tables 5 and 6 here 
There is also a growing tendency towards globalization and development of new forms of 
competition in the world economy. Globalization, here, refers to the development of global 
networking in the form of production sharing, international consortia, cross licensing agreements 
and joint-ventures (Best, 1990, 260). A global firm produces and sells in many nations in order to 
benefit from economies of scale. Moreover, it collaborate with other firms to share activities such 
as production facilities, marketing, distribution, input procurement, product development and 
design at the global level without necessarily investing abroad directly ((Ibid, 256-262). Despite 
their strategic alliance, however, the collaborating firms also compete in the final market. 
Flexible specialization is another form of new organization of firms for competition. In 
globalization firms compete mainly on costs through production sharing and networking and 
economies of scale and mass production. In flexible specialization the emphasize is placed on 
innovation and rapid adaptation to changes in the market. Here, firms compete mainly on 
differentiated products, speedy production and delivery time and cost reduction through capacity 
utilization by employing multi-use-equipments and skilled manpower. In flexible specialization 
firms may also collaborate with each other through clustering, regional conglomeration, federated 
enterprises and technological alliance. While there are some differences between the two 
methods, there are also some similarities. Integration through globalization requires, inter alia, 
large amount of capital, sophisticated technology and strategic planning; flexible specialization 
requires sophisticated technology, highly skilled labour and strategic thinking (Ibid, chap 1 and 
8). In both cases knowledge and experience are important due to the need for sophisticated 
technology, strategic action/thinking and/or high skills.   
Hence, the process of learning can be prolonged and become more costly due to these new 
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forms of competition in addition to other reasons mentioned above.  Moreover, in both cases 
attempts for networking and collaboration usually takes place among established firms.  As a 
result of combination of rapid technological change, increased scale of production, globalization, 
and the resultant rapid change in the conditions of competition, the late comer firms and 
countries are at disadvantage position for penetrating into the international market in terms of 
cost, learning period, the period of infancy, and the risk of success in the expansion of supply 
capabilities. 
According to Lazonic, (1991) a new comer firm, here a firm, here a firm of a developing 
country,  faces two types of risks: those related to productive uncertainty, and those related to 
competitive uncertainty. The first concerns the uncertainty in development of a product and the 
utilization if the developed production capacity. The competitive uncertainty is related to strategy 
and activities of its rivals-the established firms and TNCs. The large TNCs follow innovative 
strategy based on large fixed investment on R&D for development of new products and/or 
process. Their large scale permits them to ran low average cost and at the same time benefit from 
a monopoly rent. The small new comer firms which do not possess the new technology and do 
not have resources and skill to undertake R&D have to follow an “adaptive” strategy relying 
basically on cheap factors of production rather than on an innovative strategy. As they are factor 
driven, they ran less risks related to the productive uncertainty. But they ran greater competitive 
risk than established firms of developed countries. So they do run greater risks of upgrading as 
well as their ability to design and develop new products and process is limited.  
The greater risks involved implies that they should be provided by higher rewards, than 
what would be provided by the market, (expected income) through support by the state in order to 
reduce cost and the profit margin. As far as cost is concerned the firms of developing countries 
also suffer from higher cost both for production and upgrading due to their obligations under 
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TRIPs and other international agreements on intellectual property right (e.g. WIPO) or bilateral 
Free Trade Agreements (Smith, 2008). TRIPs restrict application and transfer of technology to 
developing countries as renders patents protected for 20 years. The use of the technology through 
licensing, even when awarded, involves high costs in the forms of royalty payments. 
Development of endogenous technology for production or upgrading also involves high cost and 
long time even if the skill were available in a developing country. By contrast, the holders of 
patent earn loyalties and enjoy its monopolist application in their production process for 20 years 
without marginal cost. A theoretical alternative is to develop endogenous technology. But the 
development of such technology in a developing country should also take place on selective basis 
because of the limited financial resources and technical adaptabilities.  
2.The role of FDI 
 
FDI may provide certain skills and marketing channels for exports of firms of developing 
countries where the production plants are located. Further, it is argued that when an economy 
opens up to trade and FDI, an initial period of imitation will lead to a large catch-up opportunity 
followed by a shift towards innovation “as the knowledge gap is reduced and the economy’s 
technical maturity rises” (Elkan, 1996). However, a test of the impact of FDI on the 
industrialization of a developing country is its impact on development of local capabilities 
through spill-over channels of demonstration effects, learning effects and linkages effects (Paus, 
2005). Such capabilities can be influenced, inter alia, by experience, skill development and the 
accumulation of knowledge by the labour force of the host country. Generally speaking the 
findings of the literature on the spillover effects of the FDI on the host country is mixed (for a 
comprehensive review of this literature see Görg and Greenaway, 2004). In countries where the 
government has managed FDI and supported R&D, technological development, training etc. in 
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order to develop the capabilities of the national firms, the country has succeed; on the contrary 
where the Government followed hands-off policies domestic capabilities have not developed 
much. The contrasting experience of Irland and Costa Rica (Pause, 2005) and China and Mexico 
(Gallaher and Shafaeddin, 2009, Gallaher and Zarosky, 2007 and Shafaeddin and Pizarro, 2009) 
provide good indications in this respect. Both China and Ireland have succeeded in considerable 
development of technological capabilities of their own local firms because of the active role of 
their government. By contrast, the success of Costa Rica and Mexico has been very limited 
because of the passive attitudes of the government. In other words the key to success, even with 
the involvement of FDI, is indeed the development of capabilities of the national firms which 
requires nurturing (Lall, 2005).  
The afore-mentioned changes in the international market structure, technology and 
methods of production and competition have important implications for the new comer firms, 
particularly small ones, of developing countries at early stage of industrialization. At each point 
in time it is becoming increasingly more difficult for developing countries to mobilize enough 
resources, including decision making capacity of the government and managerial capabilities of 
the firms, to become mature in more than few industries. In other words, the scarcity argument in 
favour of selectivity discussed earlier becomes even stronger when one takes into account 
changes in the international market and development in new forms of organization and 
competition in recent years.  Developing countries, with some experience in industrialization are 
endowed with more resources and capabilities than countries at early stages of development. 
Nevertheless, even in those countries deepening of industrialization and enhancing export 
capabilities require development of industries which are more technology intensive and are 
subject to more rapid technological change. Hence, for deepening their industrial structure they 
are also subject to similar consideration i.e. the need for selectivity.   
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While the need for selectivity in promotion of industries in developing countries has 
increased, the necessary policy instruments for infant industry support in general, and for 
targeting in particular, have become less and less available because of their international 
obligations. As far as trade policy is concerned liberalization of trade under Uruguay Round 
reduces the possibility of infant industry protection and targeting. The Articles of the Uruguay 
Round agreement prohibits various kinds of subsidies, including income and price support, to 
export and protection which are Aspecific to an enterprise or industry@(Shafaeddin,2005.a, chapter 
8). Many developing countries have already decreased the level and dispersion of their tariffs 
through WTO, bilateral trade agreements and/or pressure from international financial institutions. 
They have been under further pressure by developed countries, during the negotiation on NAMA, 
to reduce tariffs and bind individual tariff lines at low levels.  
The obligations to bind individual tariff lines at low levels, in particular, reduces the 
ability and flexibility of countries in using trade policy measures as a tool of selective promotion 
of their industries over time. According to WTO rules developing countries, particularly Least 
Developed Countries still have some room to manoeuvre, in applying selective support for infant 
industries (Rodrik, 2004). Nevertheless, pressure on them through bilateral trade agreements, 
particularly EPA, conditionalities of International Financial Institutions for the reduction of tariff 
levels and dispersion continues. Added to these pressures is the pressure through negotiation on 
NAMA. As I have discussed elsewhere acceptance of the proposed changes by developed 
countries on the level and structure of tariffs of developing countries will lead to de-
industrialization of those developing countries which are at early stages of industrialization and 
development and creates constraints for upgrading of the industrial structure of those with some 
industrial and export capacities (Shafaeddin 2009). 
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VI. Conclusions and implications  
for negotiations on NAMA and other trade agreements  
This study sheds some light on the theoretical arguments on the use of selectivity and uniformity 
of trade policy in trade and industrialization for   targeting industries and firms and provides a 
brief historical review of practices of East Asian countries with particular reference to Republic 
of Korea.  Furthermore, it provides empirical evidence on the impact of non-neutral tariff rates 
for a sample of 32 developing countries for the period 1980-87 - before important changes 
towards neutrality of tariff structure of developing countries took place.  The principal arguments 
in favour of selectivity are four:  sharper supply response to discriminatory prices i.e. response to 
incentives is stronger when price incentives are provided to industries selectively; scarcity of 
resources, including the decision-making capacity of the government; differential externalities 
involved in various industries; strategic trading is another argument in favour of selectivity. 
The historical evidence in the case of Republic of Korea and other East Asian countries 
indicates that targeting has paid despite the fact that it involved some costs and some mistakes in 
decision-making, but some other factors also played an important role. Such factors include 
attention to capital accumulation; development of agriculture, infrastructure, institutions and 
human resource.  Moreover, in addition to functional and/or selective government intervention, at 
each point in time market and enterprises also played their own role and interacted with each 
other.  Nonetheless, their relative role has changed over time as development proceeded.  As did 
the relative importance of import substitution and export promotion.   In fact, the Government 
applied a complex set of dynamic policies in which the relative importance of each policy in the 
set changed over time.  This set consisted of a mixture of import substitution and export 
expansion; the use of incentives on selective basis for developing new industries and relying on 
market forces for the expansion of existing industries/products; the use of incentives and 
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sanctions in targeted industries and the use of infant industry protection not for domestic 
production but also for exports. At early stages of development, when many enterprises had to 
compensate for the lack of market institutions and infrastructure, the emphasize was placed on 
import substitution, functional intervention, development of public enterprises. Later on selective 
intervention for export promotion was given more emphasize. Eventually there was a tendency 
towards neutrality and reliance on market forces. 
The selectivity in trade and industrial policies also requires certain preconditions such as 
political stability, development of the capacity of the bureaucracy in decision making, designing, 
implementing and revising policies; provision of incentives to the private sector in exchange for 
performance requirement and dynamism in trade and development policies. 
The results of the empirical study of a  sample for the 1980-87 period indicates first of all 
that on average countries with high rates of growth of exports ( Group A) showed lower than 
average level of nominal  protection together with lower growth rate of MVA than others .  By 
contrast, those with moderate, low, or negative export growth rates (Groups B and C) showed, on 
average, higher indicators of protection than the sample as a whole. But these countries also 
showed higher rate of growth of MVA than Group A.  In other words, output is more responsive 
to protection than exports. Taking into account the characteristics of the countries concern these 
results are not unexpected. Countries in group A are those with established industrial base and 
export capabilities. But the majority of those in other groups are those with little industrial 
production capacity. At early stages of industrialization, when development of production 
capacity is the main concern, nurturing of infant industries and firms would be necessary. 
Nevertheless, as industries tend to maturity, selective liberalization becomes essential in order to 
provide incentives for, and put competitive pressure on, industries which are near maturity to 
become competitive in internal and international markets.  
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Furthermore, countries which had already developed their industrial base performed 
better, in terms of both exports and output, when they liberalized their trade regime selectively, 
countries which delayed such a liberalization-Brazil and India-suffered from poor export 
performance.   It was also shown that higher indicators of non-neutrality of tariffs have been 
accompanied with better exports and particularly output performance in general.   
Finally, the need for targeting and selectivity in industrial and trade policies has increased 
in recent years because of changes in the market structure,  development of  new forms of 
organization of firms, new forms of  competition and rapid technological change.  Nevertheless, 
the use of selective government intervention- indeed intervention in general- has become 
constrained by multilateral trade rules and conditionalities attached to international lending. In 
fact, our study for a longer period covering 1980-2003 indicates uniform and universal trade 
liberalization of recent decades has resulted in de-industrialization of the majorities of developing 
countries with the exception of those countries/industries which were near the stage of maturity 
(Shafaeddin, 2006.c) 
Implications for trade negotiations and WTO rules 
The results of our study have certain implications for the desired outcome of the NAMA 
negotiation, revision of the WTO rules, including possible agreement on NAMA, regional and 
bilateral trade agreements of developing countries with developed counties. Ideally the rules 
governing international trading system and trade agreements should follow certain principals in 
order to allow developing countries a dynamic, mixed, flexible and selective trade and industrial 
policies in general, and the tariff structure in particular (see Shafaeddin, 2005.b).First, and most 
important of all is that the tariff structure should allow dynamic trade policy which can be 
changed over time. As is exemplified in table 7 in each phase of industrialization some industries 
are protected and others are subject to free trade. No industry would be subject to permanent 
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protection. While benefiting from infant industry support at early stages of development, they 
will be liberalized gradually. The average tariff rates rises first and gradually declines reaching 
zero eventually.  
 Secondly, such a flexible tariff structure would dictate the need for dispersion of the 
individual tariff rate at each point in time and over time during the industrialization process. Thus 
the individual tariff line should not be bound particularly at low levels. While binding of average 
tariffs may not necessarily pose a problem, it should not sacrifice the flexibility of the tariff 
structure. The tariff structure should be allowed to change as the country develops. 
 Thirdly, the tariff structure of each country should be based on the stage of development 
and industrial capacity of the country. As is shown in table 7, countries which are at early stages 
of industrialization need to protect their light traditional industries but let free imports of inputs 
and capital goods. Those with higher industrial capacities need to protect their selected high 
technology and capital goods and liberalize their traditional industries. For this purpose Special 
and Differential Treatment of developing countries, based on their industrial and export 
capabilities, should be an integral part of trade agreements as a rule, not as an exception. 
 The principals outlined above are necessary conditions for a tariff structure which would 
allow expansion of supply capabilities, including exports, and upgrading of the industrial 
structure of developing countries. The sufficient condition is that before entering any trade 
negotiation, a developing country should be clear about its own trade and industrial strategy. Of 
course, the principles outline above is an ideal combination which developed countries resist to 
accept easily. Nevertheless, the first step is the realization for the need for such changes. 
Otherwise, developing countries at early stages of industrialization will be trapped in production 
of resource-based, labour intensive products, and ant best assembly operations, based on their 
static comparative advantage. Those with some industrial supply capacity and export capabilities 
  
53 
will face further de-industrialization or they will suffer from lack of capabilities for upgrading 
their industrial structure. There is also need for other changes in the WTO rules (Shafaeddin, 
2009.b); we have concentrated in this study on the tariff structure alone. 
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 Table 1 
 
 Import coefficient of various industrial sectors for some Latin American countries  (1994) 
 
 
Maximum 
 
Minimum 
 
 
 
 Country 
 
 
 
Total 
manufacturing 
 
Coefficient 
 
Sector 
 
Coefficient
 
 
Sector 
 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Peru 
Mexico 
 
16.6 
11.5 
60.4 
35.9 
19.9 
19.1c 
 
 
48.9 
22.6 
233.2 
113.4 
216.1 
71.8 
 
Metal work 
Metal work 
Metal work 
Metal work 
Metal work 
Metal work 
 
2.8 
5.2 
7.4 
2.2 
6.1 
6.4 
 
Food, beverage, tobacco, 
traditional industries 
Food, beverage, tobacco 
Food, beverage, tobacco 
Food, beverage, tobacco 
Food, beverage, tobacco 
 
a
 1992 
b
 includes capital goods 
c
 1990 
 
Source:  Based on Benavente et al (1996), Table 8 
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Table 2 
 
The share of chaebol's value added  in GNP 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Chaebols 1973  1978  1983  1989  1993 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Top 5  3.5  8.1  10.0  8.4   6.2 
Top 20  7.1  14.0  16.0  13.0  10.2  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Source: Hattori (1997), p. 466.  
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 Table 3 
 
 Indicators of trade control measures on imports of 
 manufactured goods of selected developing country groups 
 
 
 
Trade Control Measures 1984-87 
 
Total charges 
 
 
Growth rate (1980-87) 
 
 
 
 Groups 
 
 
No. of  
countries 
 
 
Mean 
 
Ia 
 
 
NTMsc 
(Mean) 
 
Exports 
 
Man. 
V.Ad. 
 
GDP 
 
 
A. High export growth: 
   a. High output growth 
   b. Moderate or low output growth 
 
B. Low or negative export growth: 
   c. High output growth 
   d. Moderate output growth 
 
   e. Low or negative output growth 
 
C. Moderate export growth: 
   f. High output growth 
   g. Low output growth 
 
 
A 11 countries 
 
 
11 
(8) 
(3) 
 
18 
(1) 
(4) 
 
13 
 
3 
(1) 
(2) 
 
 
32 
 
 
35.5 
38.0 
29.2 
 
44.1 
151.9 
53.5 
 
33.6 
 
50.3 
32.3 
59.6 
 
 
41.7 
 
 
171.1 
194.0 
110.1 
 
126.8 
64.5 
137.0 
 
129.2 
 
172 
323.2 
96.5 
 
 
146.8 
 
 
40.3 
46.2 
25.7 
 
38.1 
76.5 
50.6 
(62.8) 
382 
 
31.2 
6.1 
43.8 
 
 
38.2 
(40.2)b 
 
 
21 
21.5 
19.4 
 
-0.4 
2.6 
3.5 
(2.0b) 
-1.7 
 
6.3 
7.2 
5.9 
 
 
1 
 
 
6.4 
8.2 
1.6 
 
1.1 
8.3 
4.1 
  
0.28 
 
2.3 
5.2 
2.3 
 
 
3.49 
 
 
4.6 
5.7 
1.1 
 
1.6 
4.9 
4.1 
 
0.5 
 
2.4 
3.7 
1.7 
 
 
2.9 
 
a
 Range divided by mean; selectivity index of tariffs 
b
 Figures in brackets exclude Singapore   c Non-tariff measures    d value added 
 
 
Source: Table A.2 
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Table 4 
 
 Distribution of selectivity index for various groups 
 of selected developing countries (1987) 
 
 
 
Percentage / Share of countries with I:  
 
 
 Country groups 
 
 
No. of countries  
greater than the 
averagea 
 
less than the 
average 
 
 
Total 
% 
 
 
A. High export growth 
   a. high output growth 
   b. moderate or lower output growth 
 
B. Low or negative export growth 
   e. high output growth 
   f. moderate output growthb 
   g. low or negative output growth 
 
C. Moderate export growth 
   c. high output growth 
   d. low output growth 
 
All countries 
 
 
11 
(8) 
(3) 
 
17 
(1) 
(3) 
(13) 
 
3 
(1) 
(2) 
 
31 
 
 
54 
75 
0 
 
41.2 
0 
66.0 
30.7 
 
33.3 
100 
- 
 
42.4 
 
 
45 
25 
100 
 
58.8 
100 
33.0 
69.2 
 
66.6 
0 
110 
 
57.8 
 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
100 
100 
100 
 
100 
 
Source: Based on table A.2 
 
a
 Average for all countries 
b
 Excludes Singapore 
 
  
Table 5 
 Annual average cross-border mergers and acquisition with value of more than $1billion 
(1987-2007) 
 
 
Period     No. of deals   Value ($billion)???average 
1987-96    29.3    60.7 
1997-99    107    377.8 
2000-2004    127.6    438.2 
2005     182    564.4 
2006     215    711.2 
2007     300    1161 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Source: Based on UNCTAD (2008): table 1.2 
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Table 6: 
Assets and sales of non-financial TNCs in 2006 
 
 
 Rank1 
 
 Firm 
 
 Industry 
 
Assets $ b. 
Foreign     Total 
 
Sale ($b.) 
Foreign  Total 
 
1 
 
 
10 
 
25 
 
50 
 
75 
 
100 
 
General Electric 
 
 
Wal-Mart 
 
Procter & Gamble 
 
Uniliver 
 
Metro 
 
Statoil Asa 
 
Electronic 
 
 
Retail 
 
diversified 
 
Diversifies 
 
Retail 
 
Petroleum 
 
442            697 
 
 
110           151 
 
64              138 
 
34              48 
 
23               42 
 
18               50 
 
74            163 
 
 
77            344 
 
44            76 
 
45           49 
 
41            75 
 
16           66 
 
     
 
Source: UNCTAD ( 2008), Table A.l.15. 
1.By foreign assets in 2006 
 
Table 7 
 Evolution of average tariffs for various groups of  
industries at different phases of industrialization 
 
Phase RB&LI LT MT HT Manufactures 
(Average) 
I 20 0 0 0 5 
II 10 40 0 0 12.5 
III 0 30 50 0 20 
IV 0 20 40 40 25 
V 0 10 30 40 20 
VI 0 0 15 25 10 
VII 0 0 5 15 5 
VIII 0 0 0 0 0 
Source: Akyüz (2005: 27). 
 
Notations: 
RB: Resource-based industries 
LI: Labour-intensive industries 
LT: Low-technology-intensive industries 
MT: Medium-technology-intensive industries 
HT: High-technology-intensive industries 
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Appendix A.1 
 
Definition of SITC-based product categories used in Directory of Import 
Regimes of UNCTAD 
 
 
 Product categories 
 
 SITC Rev. 2 
 
100 Primary products 
 
110 Food 
111    Cereals 
112    Vegetable oils & oil seeds 
 
120 Agricultural raw materials 
121    Textile fibres 
 
130 Crude fertilizers & mineral ores 
 
(0 to 4) + 68 
 
0 + 1 + 22 + 4 
041 to 045 
22 + 42 
 
2 - (22 + 27 + 28) 
26 
 
27 + 28 
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140 Mineral fuels 
 
150 Non-ferrous metals  
 
200 Manufactured products 
 
210 Chemicals 
211    Medicaments 
212    Toiletry & perfumery 
213    Manufactured fertilizers 
 
220 Iron & steel 
 
230 Machinery & equipment 
231    Non-electric machinery 
232    Electric machinery 
233    Transport equipment 
 
240 Other manufactured products 
241    Leather & travel goods 
242    Rubber products 
243    Wood products 
244    Paper products 
245    Textile & clothing 
246    Non-metallic mineral products 
247    Furniture 
248    Footwear 
249    Professional equipment  
 
300 All product categories  
 
3 
 
68 
 
(5 to 8) - 68 
 
5 
54 
55 
56 
 
67 
 
7 
71 to 75 
76 + 77 
78 + 79 
 
(6 + 8) - (67 + 68) 
61 + 83 
62 
63 
64 
65 + 84 
66 
82 
85 
87 + 88 
 
0 + 9 
 
Source: UNCTAD, Directory of Import Regimes, New York, 1994. 
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 Appendix Table A.2 
 Indicators of trade control measures and growth of 
 exports of manufactured of goods and outputs 
 
 
Total changes 
(unweighted) 
 
Incidence of 
NTM 
(unweighted) 
 
Growth rates (1980-87)h 
 
  
 Country and (groups)* 
 
 Mean 
 
 Ia 
 
Mean 
 
 I 
 
 X 
volumed  
 
 Man. 
 V.A. 
 
 GDP 
 
A. High export growth 
    
a)  high output growth 
.  Indonesia (II) 
.  Turkey (II) 
.  Malaysia (III) 
.  Republic of Korea (III) 
.  Sri Lanka (II) 
.  Mauritius (II)c  
.  Thailand (II) 
.  Pakistan (II) 
   Average 
 
b. Moderate or low output 
   growth 
.  Mexico (II) 
.  Venezuela (II) 
.  Morocco (II) 
   Average 
Average A 
 
B. Lower or negative  
   export growth 
 
c. High output growth 
.   India (II) 
 
d. Moderate output growth 
.  Bangladesh (I) 
.  Singapore (III) 
.  Kenya (I) 
.  Colombia (II) 
.  Average  
   (excluding Singapore) 
    
 
 
 
 
19.6 
44.9 
16.2 
25.9 
40.2 
31.6b 
42.5 
92.4 
38.0 
 
 
 
17.1 
32.4 
38.2 
29.1 
35.5 
 
 
 
 
 
151.9 
 
 
91.3c 
0.4 
41.4 
81.0 
53.5 
(71) 
 
 
 
 
 
276 
280 
245.6 
55.6 
139 
268 
127.3 
161.1 
194 
 
 
 
140.4 
74.5 
115.4 
110.1 
171.7 
 
 
 
 
 
64.5 
 
 
159 
n.a. 
178.3 
73.7 
 
(137) 
 
 
 
 
93.1 
98.1 
3.2 
5.5 
14.1 
36.9 
7.8 
82.0 
46.2 
 
 
 
11.5 
43.7 
21.8 
25.7 
40.3 
 
 
 
 
 
76.5 
 
 
46.8 
14.1 
67.5 
74.2 
50.6 
(62.8) 
 
 
 
 
36.4 
45.9 
13.4 
203.6 
248.2 
135.0 
1067.9 
34.1 
223.1 
 
 
 
371.3 
82.9 
75.5 
176.7 
124.6 
 
 
 
 
 
115.3 
 
 
148.9 
n.a. 
98.3 
93 
 
(113.4) 
 
 
 
 
43.7 
42.9 
16.9 
14.8 
14.0 
13.7 
13.6 
12.8 
21.5 
 
 
 
23.8 
19.1 
15.2 
19.4 
21.0 
 
 
 
 
 
2.6 
 
 
4.9 
4.2 
1.4 
-3.1 
3.5 
(2.0) 
 
 
 
 
7.5 
8.4 
6.7 
10.9 
6.2 
11.2 
6.1 
9.1 
8.2 
 
 
 
0.5 
2.7 
1.6 
1.6 
6.4 
 
 
 
 
 
8.3 
 
 
3.1 
4.9 
4.4 
4.1 
 
(13.4) 
 
 
 
 
3.8 
5.6 
4.7 
8.7 
3.9 
6.2 
5.7 
6.8 
5.7 
 
 
 
1.1 
0.6 
2.8 
1.1 
4.6 
 
 
 
 
 
4.9 
 
 
4.0 
6.0 
3.5 
3.2 
4.1 
(3.6) 
 
*. The grouping of countries according to per capita income and industrial capacity is shown in the brackets is based  
 on Table A.3 
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 Appendix Table A.2 (continued) 
 Indicators of trade control measures and growth of 
 exports of manufactured of goods and outputs 
 
 
Total changes 
 
Incidence of 
NTM 
 
Growth rates (1980-87)h 
 
  
 Country and (groups) 
 
 Mean 
 
 I 
 
Mean 
 
 I 
 
 X 
volume 
 
 Man. 
 V.A. 
 
 GDP 
 
e. Low or negative output 
   growth 
    
.  Ghana (I) 
.  Yugoslavia (II) 
.  Costa Rica (II) 
.  Chile (II) 
.  Nigeria (I) 
.  Bolivia (II) 
.  Côte d'Ivoire (II) 
.  Uruguay (II) 
.  Peru (II) 
.  Argentina (II) 
.  Jamaica (II) 
.  Ecuador (II) 
.  Sierra Leone (I) 
   Average  
 
Average for B 
 
C. Moderate export 
growth 
    
f. high output growth 
 Senegal (II) 
 
g. Low output growth 
.  Philippines (II) 
.  Brazil (II) 
   Averageg 
 
Average C 
 
AVERAGE TOTAL 
 
 
 
 
33.3 
13.8 
60.9 
21.8 
23.0 
17.8 
27.4 
29.2 
71.5 
41.6 
19.4 
50.1 
28.0 
33.6 
 
44.1 
 
 
 
 
 
32.3 
 
 
33.5 
85.7 
59.6 
 
50.5 
 
41.7 
 
 
 
 
 
64.6 
105.8 
213.3 
56.4 
203.0 
3.5 
134.7
79.8 
97.3 
112.7 
209.8 
194.2 
205.3 
129.2 
 
126.8 
 
 
 
 
 
323.2 
 
 
103.3 
89.6 
96.5 
 
172.0 
 
146.8 
 
 
 
 
 
42.0 
22.9 
1.0 
12.3 
15.5 
20.9 
4.4 
15.5 
45.8 
40.9 
4.8 
57.2 
100 
29.5 
 
38.1 
 
 
 
 
 
6.1 
 
 
46.3 
411.2 
43.8 
 
31.2 
 
38.2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
100.0 
256.8 
20.9 
57.3 
552.9 
79.2 
n.a. 
363.0 
97.9 
98.3 
1654.2 
163.7 
 
286.9 
 
225.3 
( 180) 
 
 
 
 
97.1 
 
 
188.3 
230.1 
209.2 
 
171.8 
 
278.9 
(128.1) 
 
 
 
 
2.9 
2.6 
2.2 
1.4 
1.1 
-0.3 
-1.5 
-2.2 
-2.5 
-3.8 
-4.1 
-6.9 
-6.7 
-1.7 
 
-0.4 
 
 
 
 
 
7.2 
 
 
5.3 
6.4 
5.9 
 
6.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.0 
2.7c 
0.0 
2.0 
1.0 
-5.5 
-2.0e 
-0.6 
3.0 
-0.7 
2.2 
0.8 
2.1 
0.28 
 
1.1 
 
 
 
 
 
5.2 
 
 
0.1 
1.5 
2.3 
 
2.3 
 
3.49 
 
 
 
 
 
1.2 
0.9 
1.4 
1.3 
-2.0 
-1.6 
2.4 
-0.5 
2.3 
-0.6 
1.0 
1.1 
0.3 
0.5 
 
1.6 
 
 
 
 
 
3.7 
 
 
0.5 
2.9 
1.7 
 
2.4 
 
2.9 
 
a
 Indicator of selectivity: tariff range divided by tariff mean X 100 
b
 80-83; tariffs only 
c
 Tariffs only 
d
 Growth in export value in constant 1980 price 
e
 1980-86 
f
 the industrial sector 
g
 excluding Jamaica 
h
 The notations for percentage growth rate are as follows: 
Exports: high: more than 10; moderate: between 10 and 5; low: less than 5; 
MVA:     high: more than  5; moderate: between  5 and 3; low: less than 3; 
 
Sources:  UNCTAD, Directory of Import Regimes, New York 1994 and Handbook of Trade Control Measures of developing 
countries, Supplement, 1987, UNCTAD/ddm/Misc. 2  
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Table A.3 
GDP per capita, MVA/GDP and the share of exports of manufactured goods 
 to total exports (1986) 
 
 
 Country / Group 
 
GDP per capita 
(in $)  
 
MVA / GDPa 
(%) 
 
Export of 
manuf./ Total 
exports (%) 
 
GROUP I 
 
Africa 
. Kenya 
. Nigeria 
. Ghana 
 
Asia 
 
. Bangladesh 
 
 
 
 
 
 
333 
389 
407 
 
 
 
153 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12.3 
3.2 
6.7 
 
 
 
9.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
2 
5 
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 Table A. 3  (continued) 
 
 Country / Group 
 
GDP per capita 
(in $)  
 
MVA / GDPa 
(%) 
 
Export of 
manuf./ Total 
exports (%) 
 
GROUP II 
 
Africa 
.Sierra Leon 
. Senegal 
. Morocco 
. Côte d'Ivoire 
. Mauritius 
 
Asia 
 
. India 
. Pakistan 
. Sri Lanka 
. Indonesia 
. Philippines 
. Thailand 
. Turkey 
.(yoguslavia): 
 
Latin America 
 
. Bolivia 
. Ecuador 
. Jamaica 
. Colombia 
. Peru 
.Costa Rica 
. Chile 
. Mexico 
. Brazil 
. Uruguay 
. Argentina 
. Venezuela 
. Trinidad and Tobago 
 
 
 
 
 
310 
420 
588 
840 
1238 
 
 
 
284 
309 
389 
442 
551 
799 
1157 
2300 
 
 
 
836 
1165 
1024 
1176 
1254 
1381 
1480 
1570 
2023 
2166 
2540 
2797 
4280 
 
 
 
 
4 
17 
27 
6(c) 
18.7 
 
 
 
18.7 
16.4 
18.1 
14.0 
23.3 
20.3 
26.5 
42(d) 
 
 
 
10.3 
16.5 
20.0 
22.4 
19.3 
20.7 
14 
21.0 
25.9 
24.0 
24.7 
18.4 
12.5 
 
 
 
 
56 
22 
23 
9 
9 
 
 
 
57 
66 
44 
18 
30 
44 
59 
58.5 
 
 
 
n.a 
1 
32 
15 
15 
18 
36 
45 
46 
35 
26 
5 
25 
 
GROUP III 
 
. Malaysia 
. Korean Republic 
. Singapore 
 
 
 
 
1733 
2342 
6773 
 
 
 
22.0 
32.2 
24.8 
 
 
 
16 
92 
59 
a
.   at constant 1980 prices     b. 1985 
c
.   current prices      d.   Industry 
 
Source: UNCTAD data base and World Bank, World Development Report, 1988. 
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